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Abstract
This paper proposes a structural model to explain the motivation of
regional public authorities to arrange marketing agreements for route and
tra¢ c development. Furthermore, using data from Spanish airports, we
empirically test this model obtaining the demand function according to the
preferences of public authorities. The results show that the public budget,
airports attributes or intermodal competition a¤ect to the demand for
aircraft operations of regional public agencies. Finally, we propose an
empirical method to determine the market power of airlines within these
marketing agreements in a particular airport or route.
1 Introduction
In recent years, some airports have experienced a signicant increase in air
tra¢ c due to the liberalization in the air transport market. In some cases, this
phenomenon has been related to the existence of new transport policy tools
which aim to promote the use of airport infrastructure with idle capacity. In
this way, an increasing number of regional airports have received the support
of their regional governments through nancial arrangements with air carriers
in order to open new routes, as well as to provide advertising services linked to
the permanence of the air carrier at a given airport. Indeed, airport managers
have more incentives to negotiate long-term contracts with air carriers in order
to reduce the risk of tra¢ c loss for their installations (Gillen, 2011).
In Europe, these types of agreements among regional governments and air
carriers have been controversial, especially for those full service carriers (FSCs)
which have made a claim to the European Commission, asking for these subsidies
to be considered illegal. This has been the case of Charleroi airport and Ryanair
(Barbot, 2006). In 2001, the Walloonian government, owner of Charleroi airport,
signed an agreement with Ryanair in order to promote the use of the Charleroi
facilities. Thus, the airport agreed to give a discount in landing fees and handling
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charges for a period of 15 years, among other measures, in exchange for Ryanair
to commit itself to using Charleroi as an operating base for the same period.
Three years later, the European Commission established that reductions in these
fees and charges were partially incompatible with the common-market principles
concerning state aids. The analysis and decision of the Charleroi-Ryanair case
allowed the European Commission to develop guidelines on the nancing of
airports and start-up aids to airlines departing from regional airports in 2005. At
the end of 2008, the European Court of First Instance annulled the Commissions
Decision. In 2014 the Commission adopted new guidelines with the aim of
adjusting to the new economic context (European Commission, 2014). In this
sense, start-up aid to airlines will only be considered compatible for routes
linking an airport with less than three million passengers per year and may
cover up to 50% of airport charges of a route for a maximum period of three
years. Additionally, for those connections which are already operated by a high-
speed rail service or by another airport in the same catchment area, such air
route will not be eligible for start-up aid.
In Spain, the Comisión Nacional de la Competencia (National Competition
Commission) issued a report about the public funds provided by regional public
authorities to di¤erent airlines, with the aim of increasing the ow of travelers
to certain destinations for the period 2007-2011 (CNC, 2011)1 . The analysis
focuses specically on those marketing agreements concluded between public
authorities and airlines. In this type of operations, the airline agrees to incorpo-
rate advertising for tourism purposes in di¤erent channels (on board magazine,
webpage or promotional tickets) and also commits to opening new routes or
maintaining those already available with origins or destinations in a certain air-
port. Meanwhile, the public authority agrees to pay for services rendered. As
the report remarks, the price of the services included in the instruments used
were determined from rates and average costs set by the airlines, although these
rates have not been disclosed in the research (CNC, 2011; page 52).
Among the reasons why the CNC considers it relevant to study this type of
public assistance are the increasing use of public support for the maintenance
of routes at certain airports along with the potential distortion that can be
generated in the allocation of productive factors. Finally, the report notes that
the regional public authorities have not reported any such public support to the
European Commission in any of the cases. This fact could reveal the perception
of public agencies that this public support is not considered possible state aid,
subject to the state aid general rules and the specic Community Guidelines on
state aid to airports and airlines (2005).
The overall volume of public funds for the period 2007-2011 was nearly
1 In October 2013, the Spanish government created the National Commission on Markets
and Competition (CNMC in Spanish) from the merger of ve agencies: the National Energy
Commission (CNE), the Commission for the Telecommunications Market (CMT), the National
Competition Commission (CNC), the National Commission for the Postal Sector and the
Railway and Airport Regulatory Commission. The merge of the bodies was justied by the
cost savings that this could generate for public nances.
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250 million euros, concentrated in a few number of airlines. The distribution
of public support was also not uniform across Spanish airports. Furthermore,
the report showed that airports presented a negative correlation between their
ratio of public funds per passenger and their corresponding tra¢ c growth rates.
From these results, one might ask how suitable this type of support is. A
cost-benet analysis of this public policy could determine whether the policy
followed by numerous governments generates some kind of gains in terms of
social welfare. However, this type of analysis is beyond the scope of this work
due to its enormous complexity.
The literature related with regional public support to airlines and airports is
recent and scarce. Barbot (2006) analyses the e¤ects of subsidies for secondary
airports on competition between low cost and full-scheduled carriers. This study
also assesses a case study of the Ryanair-Charleroi airport agreement. The main
results are that subsidization provokes a growth in demand, adding new users
and a switch of passengers from full-scheduled carriers to low cost airlines. As
far as the airport is concerned, the proposed model shows that the airport may
benet more from the arrangement than the subsidized air carrier, depending
on its e¢ ciency.
Malina et al. (2012) investigate incentive programs for route and tra¢ c de-
velopment at the 200 largest European airports in 2010. Two types of airport
incentive schemes should be mentioned: o¢ cial incentive programs and bilateral
agreements between airports or regional authorities on one side and airlines on
the other side. They nd that the largest airports almost exclusively employ
the published incentive programs, whereas small and medium-sized airports use
both mechanisms. The authors argue that transaction costs could partially
explain these facts. In this sense, larger airports could not bear the costs of
negotiating bilateral agreements with di¤erent airlines, so the introduction of
a dedicated incentive program might reduce these transaction costs. The de-
scriptive study of Malina et al. (2012) do not study specically the bilateral
agreements due to the scarcity of o¢ cial sources. However, they exemplied the
Spanish case regarding the use of bilateral agreements between public author-
ities and airlines. Other descriptive studies which focus on this topic describe
the evidence of German airports (Fichert and Klophaus, 2011), U.S. airports
(Whittman, 2014) or European airports (Jones et al., 2013).
Allroggen et al. (2013) investigate determinants for o¤ering incentives for
the case of a sample of European airports. In this case, an empirical specica-
tion is proposed using a probit instrumental variable model with cross-sectional
data. In order to justify the existence of these economic incentives, this paper
shows that an airport authority calculates whether introducing incentives is eco-
nomically viable by using the projected net present value of the incentives for
route and tra¢ c development. They demonstrate that airport competition, the
importance of service sector, the economic regulation of airports, the existence
of low cost tra¢ c, the amount of charges, or the ownership structures have an
impact on the presence of these incentives. In their conclusion, the authors
point out the relevance of studies that focus on the existence of incentive pro-
grams at airports controlled by public entities in the debate on state aid and
3
subsidization of airports within Europe.
Laurino and Beria (2014) discuss the main incentive schemes used by three
Italian airports to attract airlines, which are often based on bilateral agreements
rather than on transparent incentive programs. They focus on the common
di¢ culties found related to the implementation of such tools and on the e¤ects
of these on the airports nancial results. The application of the 2005 EC
Guidelines, the role of public entities in determining regional aviation policy or
the risk of cannibalization among airports trying to attract airlines are the main
topics studied by means of three case studies.
The literature on public service obligations in the air transport market also
presents some connections with the di¤erent mechanisms of public support to
airlines. In the Spanish context, some subsidies are granted to passengers living
in the archipelagos of the Canary and Balearic Islands and also from passengers
living in the Spanish autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla located in the north
of Africa. Calzada and Fageda (2012) show that those routes with discounts for
island residents have higher fares than on the rest of domestic routes. In this
sense, these discounts might be working as a specic subsidy to airlines. Valido
et al. (2014) demonstrate that air transport subsidies for resident passengers
may produce ine¢ ciencies in the market damaging the welfare of non-resident
passengers. In this sense, they nd that if the proportion of residents is high
enough, non-resident passengers may be expelled from the market.
To our knowledge no previous theoretical or empirical study has examined
the specic bilateral agreements between regional public authorities and airlines
in any detail. The increasing importance of these types of incentive schemes
in di¤erent countries as well as the controversy generated in relation to the
common-market principles of the European legislation justify the need for a
deeper analysis. The present paper intends to bridge this gap. In this paper we
propose a structural model to explain the motivation of regional public authori-
ties to arrange marketing agreements in order to attract new operators for their
corresponding public airports. Such agreements are of special relevance in Spain
(Malina et al., 2012), given the special features of the Spanish airport system in
which a single public entity (Aena) manages the entire set of Spanish airports,
weakening potential competition between them. Likewise, since we have annual
public funding to increase the number of passengers for each airport it is possi-
ble to empirically test this model obtaining the demand function according to
the expenditure preferences of public authorities. Finally, we propose a method
to determine the market power of airlines within these marketing agreements
in a particular airport or route. This measure may be particularly relevant in
order to know which variables could explain the large variability of public funds
in the bargaining process of marketing agreements between public authorities
and airlines.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the main features
of the Spanish airport system. The theoretical model is presented in Section
3. Section 4 shows the econometric specication. The discussion of data is
explained in Section 5. In Section 6 we discuss the econometric results. An ap-
plication for the demand estimates in order to calculate the airlines bargaining
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power for marketing agreements with public authorities is presented in Section
7. Finally, in Section 8, we present the conclusions and policy implications
regarding the public funds perceived by airlines.
2 The Spanish airport system
The Spanish airport system is managed by Aeropuertos Españoles y Navegación
Aérea, Aena (Spanish Airports and Air Navigation), a public-owned entity
which owns and operates the most important airports in Spain, dependent on the
Ministerio de Fomento (Ministry of Development) since 1990. It is considered
one of the main airport operators in the world, given that it manages 47 airports
and 2 heliports in Spain and participates directly or indirectly in another 27
airports worldwide. Unlike other airport systems, the Spanish system has always
been characterized by high centralization in the decision-making process through
Aena, which manages all Spanish airports, barely taking into account their
di¤erent characteristics. Thus, the funding mechanism of airport investments
is made through a common fund, where no airport is accountable in terms of
their operation and where cross-subsidies are present. In this sense, Bel and
Fageda (2009) point to the existence of such subsidies mainly from specialized
airports in tourist tra¢ c to the major airport infrastructure. In this way, 14
of the Spanish airports presented operating prots, whereas 33 had operating
losses.
This type of management is di¤erent from other transport infrastructure
in Spain. This is the case of Spanish ports, whose reforms of 1992 and 1997
led to the decentralization of decision-making of each port authority with the
participation of regional authorities on their boards, while they were forced to
comply with the principle of nancial self-su¢ ciency (Núñez-Sánchez, 2013).
Moreover, their pricing policy is uniform for the entire system and regulated
by Law (Act 25/1998) given that airport charges are considered public fees.
This regulation di¤erentiates three types of airports depending on their lev-
els of tra¢ c in order to promote higher tra¢ c level in those secondary airports.
However, the annual update of these public fees is also uniform for every airport,
so they do not necessarily correspond with costs. Another important feature of
the Spanish airport system is the huge investment process which Aena imple-
mented for the 2000-2010 period, more than eighteen thousand million euros,
in order to increase the capacity of the incumbent commercial airports, as well
as the creation of new ones in low-density population regions. This is the case
of Burgos Airport (opened in 2008) or the Huesca-Pirineos Airport (considered
commercial in 2000). One of the aims of the transport infrastructure policy of
this decade is the promotion of regional development through investments in
highways, airports and high-speed rail systems. This process left Aena with a
total debt of fourteen thousand million euros.
In 2010, Act 13/2010 presented a new legal framework for the modernization
and liberalization of the management of Spanish airports. The new rules aimed
to transform the airport model into a more decentralized management system,
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increasing the private sector collaboration. In this way, the Law created a new
rm Aena Aeropuertos (Aena Airports), whose capital initially belonged to
AENA, but provided the possibility of private capital inows in the future.
Thus, in July 2011 the Council of Ministers approved the agreement autho-
rizing the sale of shares of Aena Aeropuertos to a maximum of 49 percent of
its share capital. At the same time, it authorized the creation of concession
societies for the airports of Madrid-Barajas and Barcelona-El Prat in order to
privatize 90 percent of their capital. The new regulation encouraged individu-
alized management of airports by two alternative schemes: a) A concession of
airport services, in which the concessionaire freely managed the airport at his
own risk, or b) The creation of subsidiaries, which applied the same rules set
for the rm Aena Aeropuertos.
However, in January 2012 the new elected government denitely canceled
the auction for the concession of both airports given that the process of pri-
vatization was incompatible with its proposed airport management model. In
this sense, the Minister of Transport acknowledged that the privatization of
both airports would have generated competition between Madrid-Barajas and
Barcelona El Prat, when the Ministrys intention was that Spanish airports
would compete with major global hubs. In this context and during the last
few years, Spanish airports have not had any tools that would allow them to
compete, trying to improve their number of routes and passenger volume. How-
ever, through di¤erent mechanisms, regional public authorities have tried to
promote airport infrastructure located in its territory. This task has proven to
be anything but simple as they cannot take part in decision-making processes
regarding investments in capacity, quality or pricing2 .
Finally, in June 2014 the Spanish government approved partial privatization
of Aena Aeropuertos, which will take place between February-March 2015. The
Spanish government would maintain 51 percent of total shares and therefore
control of the company. This model of privatization did not convince the Spanish
regulatory agency, the Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia
(National Commission of Markets and Competition), which argued that the
imposition of a public-private monopoly preserves the status-quo of airports but
inhibits competition among airports.
3 Theoretical model
We consider a public agency that aims to promote the tourism sector in their
region, which presents the following utility function:
U (Y;G) (1)
where Y represents total aircraft movements in the airport located in its region
and G represents the public expenditure in promotion of the tourism sector
2An interesting case study of the use of subsidies in the promotion of airport infrastructure
is related by Bel (2009), for the case of Girona airport.
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excluding those public funds for tourism purposes perceived by airlines. We
consider that @U(:)@Y > 0,
@U(:)
@G > 0 and
@2U(:)
@Y 2 < 0,
@U2(:)
@G2 < 0. We assume that
Y is distributed as:
Y (S) =

Y0 if S = 0
Y0 + YS (S) if S > 0
(2)
where Y0 represents those aircraft movements in the airport which do not per-
ceive any public fund that we call natural aircraft movements and YS (S) the
rest of aircraft movements which depend on the volume of public funds from
marketing agreements between public authorities and airlines. We assume that
@YS(S)
@S > 0 and
@2YS(S)
@S2 = 0
YS = S;  > 0 (3)
Thus, the decision problem of the regional public authority is dened as:
max
S;G
U (Y (S); G)
s:t: S +G = B
(4)
where B is dened as the total public budget of the regional public authority
for the promotion of the tourism sector. Using equations 2 and 3, we may also
express this budget constraint as:
G =

B if S = 0 
B + Y0
  Y if S > 0
The budget constraint shows that public authority has to decide either to
arrange marketing agreements with airlines or spend on other tourism-related
activities. The equilibrium will be characterized by the pair (Se; Ge) such that:
(Se; Ge) = max fU (Y (S); G) ; U (Y (0); G)g, where (S; G) is the interior
solution. Rearranging the FOC interior conditions of 4 we obtain that, for the
case of S > 0, public agency should allocate its budget in order to fulll the
following condition:
MRSGY =   dGdY =
@U(:)
@Y
@U(:)
@G
= 1 if S > 0 (5)
otherwise:
MRSGY =   dGdY =
@U(:)
@Y
@U(:)
@G
= 0 if S = 0 (6)
Figure 1 shows this argument geometrically. We observe the situation in which
the optimal solution is (Y (0); G). In this case, the aircraft movements in the
airport would be Y0, and G  B. From 4 we obtain the the public expenditure
function for marketing agreements with airlines of the regional public agency,
S = S(Y0; B) (7)
This function species what the public agency would spend on marketing agree-
ments with airlines for each natural aircraft movements and budget situation,
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assuming it perfectly solves the utility maximization problem. In order to im-
prove its economic interpretation, we may rearrange equation 7 dividing both
sides by Y ,
s = s(Y0; B; Y ) (8)
where s = S=Y is the unit public funds, which is the ratio between public funds
allocated for marketing agreements and total aircraft movements. We interpret
this equation 8 as an "inverse demand function" for the public authority in
the sense that expresses the maximum unit public fund that is willing to grant
for a certain amount of additional aircraft movements, given the public budget
and the natural aircraft movements. From this framework, we are able to ob-
tain relevant information about how sensitive willingness to pay is in di¤erent
situations and contexts for public authorities according to their preferences.
4 Econometric specication
4.1 Tobit models with exogenous regressors
As we have mentioned in previous sections, some public agencies do not grant
any subsidy in order to increase aircraft movements in airports located in their
region. So, the dependent variable of the specication 8, s, follows the next
pattern:
s =

s if s > 0
0 if s  0 (9)
where s is considered as an unobserved latent variable. In this context, OLS
estimation using censored data will lead to inconsistent estimation of the pa-
rameters. Then, we may use a Tobit model, which allows us to control our
censored sample but requires the strong assumption about normality and ho-
moskedasticity. The Tobit model is therefore often too restrictive in practice,
especially for those variables which present skewness, as is the case of our vari-
able of interest, s. However, we may circumvent this problem taking logs in
our variable and considering as a lognormal where we observe (Cameron and
Trivedi, 2005)
s =

s if ln(s) > s0
0 if ln(s)  s0 (10)
where s0 6= 0:
Given that natural aircraft movements, Y0 is not observable for the econo-
metrician we consider z1 as the vector of the "reduced-form" variables that
determine the value of Y0. Take logs in 8 we have the following econometric
relationship:
ln(s) = max[s0; z111 + 12 ln(B)  13 ln(Y ) + u1] (11)
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4.2 Tobit models with endogenous regressors
Following Wooldridge (2002), we consider a type I Tobit model which includes
Y as an endogenous explanatory variable. We consider the structural public
agency demand model
ln(Y ) = z111 + 12 ln(B) + z213 + v1 (12)
ln(s) = max[s0; z121 + 22 ln(B)  23 ln(Y ) + v2] (13)
where (v1; v2) are zero-mean normally distributed, independent of z. If v1 and
v2 are correlated, then Y is endogenous. Finally, we need that 13 6= 0 in order
to solve the identication problem.
5 Data and description
5.1 Data
Our analysis uses the results of the survey carried out by CNC (2011), which
focus on those actions of administrations and public agencies in order to increase
the ow of passengers to certain destinations from 2007 until 2011. Among them,
we nd public funds which were granted to airlines for opening new routes or
nancial arrangements aimed at the provision of advertising or tourism promo-
tion services by the airline in exchange for their permanence at a particular
airport for a certain period of time3 . To collect this information, the CNC sent
a questionnaire to all regional public authorities, Aena, the Tourism Institute
of Spain (Turespaña) and those airlines with more than ve million passengers
per year in 2010 (Iberia tra¢ c, Ryanair, Air Europa, Spanair, Air Nostrum,
Vueling, EasyJet and AirBerlin). Additionally, the CNC required all nancial
agreements whose main objective had been advertising or tourism promotion to
be carried out by the airlines. Public agencies and airlines signed 124 bilateral
agreements from 2007 to April 2011. As we see in Figure 2 more than half of the
contracts were for an amount below half a million euros while sixteen contracts
exceeded two million euros.
Potential beneciaries of public funds arising from these contracts and agree-
ments are the airlines directly, and airports, indirectly. Regarding airlines, the
emergence of low cost airlines in the early twenty-rst century brought new op-
portunities for those regional airports, reducing ticket prices and generating a
change in the structure of the aviation market. However, as pointed out by the
CNC in its report Air Nostrum, a franchise company of regional Iberia ights, is
the largest recipient of such funds. Second, Ryanair gets an increasing amount
3As remarks the Comisión Nacional de la Competencia, given that none of these public
agencies have notied the European Commission in order to enforce the State Aid Rules and
the Guidelines, they probably do not consider them a public aid. However, the opening of
investigations by the European Commission in some airports in di¤erent European countries
(France, Germany or Romania) make the study of such subsidies in the Spanish case relevant.
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of public funds. Third, Lagunair that went bankrupt in 2009 and fourth, the
low-cost carrier Vueling.
As regards airports, they benet indirectly from such public funds to in-
crease the number of routes or frequencies of the existing ones. Zaragoza, León,
Santander, Valladolid or Burgos were the main beneciaries; all of them consid-
ered secondary regional airports given that all of them carried a lot less than 1.5
million passengers per year. In this way, some regional agencies from Castilla
y León (84 million euros), Aragón (34 million euros), Galicia (23 million euros)
or Cantabria (21 million euros) distributed public funds worth over 20 million
euros for the period 2007-2011. On the other hand, carriers which operated in
Barcelona, Bilbao, Granada-Jaén, Jerez, Sevilla and Vitoria did not receive any
public funds. Other administrations have not considered it relevant to reach
agreements with carriers in order to tie some airlines to the airports located in
their regions. This is the case of Navarra (0.55 million Euros), Madrid (0.52
million euros) or Andalucía (0.19 million euros) (Figure 3). In this way, we
observe that some of the most important Spanish airports do not benet from
these agreements. As the CNC (2011) mentions, public funds increased for the
period 2007-2011. In this way, in 2007 almost 30 million euros were granted to
airlines, whereas in 2009 the total amount came to 62.5 million euros.
A summary of the public funds and some characteristics of the Spanish
airports is presented in Table 1. Regarding results, only 11 airports presented
positive operating prots for the period 2007-2011 (Alicante, Bilbao, Fuerteven-
tura, Girona, Ibiza, Lanzarote, Gran Canaria, Palma de Mallorca, Tenerife Sur,
Sevilla and Valencia). Most of these airports are specialized in tourism with pas-
senger levels higher than 4 million passengers. Within this group, just Girona
(1.04 million euros), Alicante (1.64 million euros) and Valencia (1.64 million eu-
ros) presented signicant public support, with a signicant presence of low-cost
carriers. Furthermore, the two airports less specialized in tourism, Bilbao and
Sevilla, did not indirectly perceive any public funds. Regarding the two largest
Spanish airports, Madrid and Barcelona, both showed negative operating prots
despite the number of passengers involved. On the other hand, the main ben-
eciaries of public funds (Zaragoza, León, Santander, Salamanca, Valladolid or
Burgos) generated signicant operating losses due to the low number of passen-
gers concerned, less than 1 million passengers per year. All of them are located
in cities or provinces in which tourism is not an important economic sector.
Another group of airports with low level of passengers and signicant amount
of public funds are: Albacete (1.44 million euros), Badajoz (1.87 million euros),
Logroño (0.72 million euros) and Melilla (0.72 million euros). Finally, we nd
several airports that handle between 1 and 2.5 million passengers per year, most
of them located in northerm Spain, which experience moderate operating losses
(Asturias, A Coruña, Santiago and Vigo).
5.2 Variables
In our econometric specication the dependent variable is the unit public funds
granted by public authorities to airlines. Unfortunately, the CNC report does
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not provide data disaggregated by airline, so we just observe those aggregated
public funds by airport4 . As we mentioned in previous sections, the unit subsidy
(s) is calculated as the total amount of public funds by airport over the total
aircraft movements in the airport (Y ). This variable was obtained from the
report of CNC (2011) and the statistical service of Aena5 .
Regarding the explanatory variables, the variable public budget (B) is dened
as the total public budget of the public authority for the promotion of the
tourism sector but also the promotion of retailing activities and the small and
medium-sized enterprises (SME). It was collected from the general budgets of
the corresponding regions6 . The unavailability of more disaggregated statistics
for each region prevented us considering a variable that only collects the public
promotion of the tourism sector. However, the use of o¢ cial statistics from the
Ministry of Finance and Public Administration allows the information to be
homogeneous across regions.
Additionally, as we mentioned in Section 4.1 the variable natural aircraft
movements, Y0 is not observable for the econometrician, so we considered z1 as
the vector of the "reduced-form" variables that determined the value of Y0.
z1 = (pop; dist; isl; low cos t;motway; railway; eind; tourism;Mad;BCN)
(14)
The rst variable refers to the population (pop), which is dened as the
total population of the province where the airport is located (INE, 2013). This
variable might capture the size of their catchment area. While it seems clear
that there is a positive e¤ect of the size of the airports catchment area on its
natural tra¢ c, in the case of unit subsidy the e¤ect is not clear.
The variable distance (dist) shows the distance of the nearest airport, ex-
pressed in kilometers. Two, or more, airports might compete if they share a
local market. The existence of overlapping catchment areas of di¤erent airports
might induce greater competition. Thus, airports might establish either incen-
tives to airlines for route and tra¢ c development or bilateral agreements with
airlines (Malina et al., 2012). We have also included a dummy variable island
(isl) which captures whether the airport is located on an island or not.
The following variable refers to the percentage of passengers that uses low-
cost carriers (lowcost). To construct this variable, we collected the total number
of passengers handled by the low-cost carriers for every individual airport7 . We
4 In some cases, tourism promotion contracts between public agencies and airlines did not
link this promotion of the use of a particular airport. Therefore, for regions with multiple air-
ports, which was not specied which ones were the beneciaries, the amount of the agreements
have been distributed uniformly (CNC, 2011).
5The statistical data about air tra¢ c in the Aenas airports can be consulted at:
http://www.aena.es/csee/Satellite?pagename=Estadisticas/Home.
6The Spanish Public Administration Ministry provides detailed infor-
mation about the di¤erent regional general budgets in the following link:
http://serviciosweb.meh.es/apps/publicacionpresupuestos/aspx/inicio.aspx. We have
used the account 43 that refers to Retailing, Tourism and SME.
7We considered the following airlines as low-cost carriers: Ryanair, EasyJet, Norwegian,
Vueling, Clickair, BMI Baby, WizzAir, Air Lingus, Air Baltic, Jet2.com, AirBerlin, Condor,
Monarch Airlines, Meridiana, Cimber, Volare Airlines, Myair, Transavia, Flybe, BMIBaby,
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use this variable as nominator and the total number of passengers as denomi-
nator. Then, we proceeded to calculate the respective fraction. The expected
relationship between this variable and the unit subsidy would be positive for sev-
eral reasons. First, because the use of low-cost carriers has increased in recent
years. Second, these airlines often o¤er cheaper fares than other companies.
Therefore, the most important target for these airlines is leisure passengers,
whose demand is more elastic.
Other important variables related with the natural aircraft movements are
those related with the intensity of intermodal competition. We have considered
the following variables: the density of motorways (motway) and the density of
railways (railway) of the region where the airport is located. Both variables are
dened as the total kilometers of motorways and railways, respectively divided
by the total area of the region, expressed in 100km2. They were obtained
from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (National Statistics Institute) and
Ministerio de Fomento (Ministry of Development), respectively. The existence
of intermodal transport infrastructures might reduce the willingness to grant a
certain amount of additional aircraft movements.
The variable regional industrial specialization index (eind) tries to capture
the sectorial specialization of the airports region8 . In this case, a more attrac-
tive catchment area, in terms of business passengers, might have inuence on
the unit subsidy s. Additionally, a variable related to the tourism intensity of
the airports province (tourism) has been included9 . That index is based on
the tax rate applied to tourism activities. Its value reects the relative weight
of tourism on a single region compared to Spain. As we saw in the descriptive
analysis presented in the previous section we noted that the e¤ect of this vari-
able on the unit public funds is unclear. On the one hand, there is a group
of airports in specialized provinces in the tourism sector beneting from public
funds. But on the other hand, the largest recipients were secondary airports.
Finally, we have also considered the distances between the city in which the
airport is located and the largest Spanish cities: Madrid (Mad) and Barcelona
(BCN), which concentrates most of the ights in the Spanish secondary air-
ports. We expected that higher distances to these cities might increase the
sensitivity of unit public funds.
Table 2 shows the main summary statistics for these variables10 .
Thomsony, German Wings, Hapag Lloyd Express, FlyBaboo and BlueAir.
8The regional industrial specialization index shows the relative importance (in terms of
GDP) of the industrial sector in a region in relation with the total country. If we consider a
national economy with H regions (h=1,...,H) and K sectors (k=1,...,K) this index eindij for
the region i in the particular sector j is dened as:
eindij =
GDPijP
k GDPikP
j GDPhjP
k
P
k GDPhk
9The tourism index comes from the Economic Yearbook of Spain published by la Caixa,
available on its website: http://www.anuarioeco.lacaixa.comunicacions.com/
10As we mentioned in previous sections, Aena manages 47 airports and 2 heliports in Spain.
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6 Econometric results
Table 3 shows the results obtained for di¤erent specications of the Tobit model
presented in Section 4. Specication (1) shows a standard Tobit model whereas
in specication (2) and (3) consider the possibility of endogenous regressors.
In particular, in specication (2) we treat the variable aircraft movements, Y ;
as an endogenous explanatory variable. The set of instruments used for this
variable are related with the fees paid to the airports and a measure of ter-
minal productivity (product), which is dened as the total passengers handled
divided by the area of the passengers terminal. Given that the actual fees
are not observable for each airport, we proxy them by using dummy variables,
which capture the di¤erent categories of Spanish airports. Until 2011, Spanish
regulation considered three categories of airports. Every category (First cate-
gory: ac1; Second category: ac2; Third category: ac3) has its own fees. Finally,
in specication (3) we also treat the variables lowcost and tourism as an en-
dogenous variables. Thus, we choose one-period lag values of the percentage
of passengers that uses low-cost carriers and tourism intensity of the airports
province as explanatory variables, using the same framework of Allroggen et al.
(2013). The parametric (MLE) estimation method of specication (2) and (3)
assumes that the structural (Eq.13) and reduced-form (Eq.12) equation errors
are jointly normally distributed. The results are consistent for all the specica-
tions. In these specications we also present a Wald test of exogeneity. In this
case, we reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity so the use of an instrumental
variable Tobit approach is justied. Moreover, the Hansens J test of the pos-
sible endogeneity of the instruments is provided in order to test the validity of
the instruments. In specications (2) and (3) the J statistics are 0.55 and 0.37,
respectively (p-values 0.76 and 0.83) so we cannot reject the null hypothesis of
exogeneity of the instruments, that is E (z2v2) = 0. Thus, we demonstrate the
validity of the instruments.
The variable total aircraft movements (Y ) is highly signicant and presents
a negative sign, supporting the downward sloping of the "inverse demand curve"
for public authorities. The coe¢ cient of the variable public budget (B) of public
authorities is also negative and statistically di¤erent to zero. This result shows
the negative relationship between the total amount of public budget and the
unit public funds perceived for airlines in a particular airport. Thus, those air-
ports located in regions with higher public budgets present lower unit subsidies.
This result suggests that those regions with high specialization in the tourism
sector do not use these type of contracts and agreements in order to increase the
ow of passengers if we compare them with other less-specialized regions. Ad-
ditionally, considering the theoretical model developed in previous sections we
may interpret that public agencies consider the existence of additional aircraft
movements as an inferior good.
Regarding the variables population (pop) and distance (dist), they are both
However, a signicant number of them do not have commercial ights. This is the case of
Ceuta, Córdoba, Cuatro Vientos, Huesca-Pirineos, Torrejón, Sabadell and Son Bonet. In our
analysis, we have not included them in order to mantain homogeneity in our sample.
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positive and statistically signicant. This suggests that airports with larger
inuence areas (with the possibility of the existence of density economics) ben-
et from servicing airlines which receive higher unit public funds. The positive
coe¢ cient related to distance supports the idea that public authorities do not
consider granting these contracts to be the way to increase competition among
nearer airports. This latter nding is consistent with the results of Allroggen
et al. (2013) for European airports, which shows that airports are less likely to
introduce incentives for route development if they face higher competition from
other airports.
On the other hand, the dummy variable for airports located on islands (isl)
is negative and statistically signicant, so we might interpret that the island
public authorities do not consider it to be necessary to provide public funds in
order to attract tra¢ c. It could be possible that the existence of mechanisms
of public service obligations considered as a sort of specic subsidy to airlines
(Calzada and Fageda, 2012) had some inuence on this result.
We also observe the positive relationship between the percentage of passen-
gers that use low-cost carriers and higher unit subsidies. This result is similar
to the ndings reported by Allroggen et al. (2013), which show that those
airports with a positive management attitude towards potential prots from
low-cost tra¢ c (especially from Ryanairs passengers) present higher probabil-
ity of the presence of incentives. Other authors such as Bel and Fageda (2010),
consider that low-cost airlines have a greater negotiating capacity than other
airlines. Given that lowcost might be endogenous, we have considered di¤erent
specications for the model.
In the case of variables related to intermodal competition, both variables
motway and railway have the expected signs but just the density of motorways
is statistically signicant in all of the specications. This result shows the
importance of competition between di¤erent modes, in this case, road and air
transport.
Additionally, the unit public subsidies are higher in the case of regions more
specialized in the industry sector (eind). Then, we might consider the attrac-
tiveness of the catchment area as a relevant factor to explain the importance of
bilateral agreements between public authorities and airlines. However, we have
not found any signicant relationship between tourism intensity (tourism) and
public subsidies. This nding might be explained by the fact that, in many of
these agreements there are clauses that do not seem to be linked to the objective
of promoting one or more destinations, but respond to other purposes. In this
sense, the report of the CNC (2011) shows that one of these aspects are the
requirements and conditions imposed on airlines, in terms of completion of a
minimum number of destinations from a particular airport.
Although the distance between the city in which the airport is located and
Madrid or Barcelona is positively related with higher unit subsidies, this esti-
mated e¤ect is not statistically signicant at 5%.
Last, we have included both temporal dummies and regional dummies in
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order to capture unobservable e¤ects11 .
In order to check the sensitivity for the elasticity of the aircraft movements
demand for public authorities, Table 4 reports di¤erent elasticity measures for
the specication (2) using di¤erent values of some relevant variables such as:
total aircraft movements (Y ), public budget (B), population (pop), percentage
of low-cost passengers (lowcost), density of motorways (motway) and the in-
dustrial specialization index (eind). Regarding the elasticity of this variable
"s;Y =
@s
@Y
Y
s , results show a negative relationship between the sensitivity of
unit public funds and size (in terms of aircraft movements) of the airport. The
sensitivity of unit subsidies of regional public agencies is larger when the size
of the airport is smaller. So, public authorities are willing to grant higher unit
subsidies in order to retain aircraft movements as the size of the airport de-
creases. This result seems logical, given that in some of the smaller Spanish
airports, just one airline operates. This is the case of Badajoz, Burgos, or La
Rioja, in which only the company Air Nostrum provides ights. There is exists
also a negative relationship between the elasticity of unit subsidies, "s;Y , and
the public budget or the density of motorways in the region in which the airport
is located. Thus, the sensitivity of unit subsidies is larger when public budget
or density of motorways is smaller. It is specially interesting to observe the high
sensitivity of the elasticity with relation to the di¤erent values of the density of
motorways.
On the other hand, population, percentage of low-cost passengers and the
specialization in the industry sector present a negative relationship with the
elasticity of unit subsidies, "s;Y . Calculating the inverse of this variable, we
obtain "Y;s = @Y@s
s
Y , the elasticity of the aircraft movements demand for public
authorities.
7 Application of the demand estimates
We have specied the inverse demand estimation procedure and elasticity esti-
mates which can be useful for the economic analysis of public funds perceived
by airlines. We now consider a possible application in order to use these esti-
mates.We propose an oligopoly model à la Cournot in which airlines set capac-
ities simultaneously in a certain route or airport.
We consider the decision-making problem of the rst stage for an airline
which operates in a particular route or airport and perceives public funds from
a marketing agreement. In the second stage, the airline would decide fares once
it has installed capacity in a particular route or airport. In this application we
do not consider this second stage due to the limitations of data concerned to
public funds. We demonstrate that it is relevant to gather information about
the elasticity of demand, in order to determine the market power of the airlines
in the bargaining process of marketing agreements between public authorities
and airlines. This model may be tested either in a particular route or airport.
First, we dene the decision-making problem of an airline as
11Coe¢ cient related to temporal and regional dummies are also available on request.
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max
yi
(yi; y i)  s (Y ) yi   Ci (yi)
where yi is the aircraft operations of the carrier i, y i is dened as the aircraft
operations of other carriers in the same route or airport and s (Y ) expreses the
inverse demand function of public authorities, which we dened.in Section 3.
The rst-order condition of prot maximization is
@s(Y )
@Y
@Y
@yi
yi + s(Y )  @Ci(qi)
@yi
= 0 (15)
After some arrangements, we can rewrite 15 as
s(Y )

1  i
"Y;s

= c0i (16)
where i =
yi
Y is dened as the market share of airline i. We can also express
the equation 16 as
s(Y )  c0i
s(Y )
=   i
"Y;s
(17)
where i =
yi
Y is dened as the market share of airline i. Hence, this model
predicts that in a given market, a larger airline should have a larger markup. If
we weigh up airlines by their market shares, we obtain the following expression
s(Y )

i   
2
i
"Y;s

= ic
0
i (18)
Next, we aggregate the rst-order conditions for all the airlines
s(Y )

1  H
"Y;s

=
NX
i=1
ic
0
i (19)
where H =
NX
i=1
2i is dened as Herndahl index, which measures the degree
of concentration of the airlines in a particular route or airport. Re-arranging
s(Y ) 
NX
i=1
ic
0
i
s(Y )
=   H
"Y;s
(20)
We conclude that the average Lerner index is proportional to the Herndahl
index. Then, calculating the Herndahl index and estimating the public funds
elasticity of demand allows for calculation of the average markup in a particular
route or airport. Equation 20 also allows us to evaluate the existence of a
monopoly in a particular airport or route, given that in that case, the Herndahl
index would be equal to one. Therefore, the Lerner index in this case would be
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inversely proportional to the elasticy of the public authority demand. Therefore,
rst we have calculated the Herndahl index using data from statistics of Aena
website, given the availability of the airlinesmarket shares for each airport.
Secondly, we have estimated the individual elasticity "Y;s for each airport at
the mean values of the di¤erent explanatory variables of our estimated model.
Thus, using equation 20 we estimate the average bargaining power of airlines.
Table 5 reports the average mark-up for airlines which perceives public funds
in the Spanish airports for the period 2007-2011. These estimates ranges from
the minimum value, 0.0015 but not statistically di¤erent from zero, which cor-
responds to Málaga to the maximum value, 3.4, of La Gomera. Other airports
which present signicant high markups of airlines are: Girona (2.2), El Hierro
(2.58), Reus, Murcia (2.35) or Melilla (3.28) In these airports the Herndahl
index shows the existence of only one air carrier, with the exception of Murcia.
In the case of La Gomera, the regional air carrier Binter Canarias is the mo-
nopolist which just operates in inter-islands ights between the di¤erent Canary
Islands. For the Catalonian airports of Girona and Reus it is Ryanair, the only
air carrier that operates with regular ights. Furthermore, both airports are
considered operating bases for Ryanair12 Finally, in Melilla, located in North-
ern Africa, the only company which operates is Air Nostrum. Regarding those
airports which present low average mark-up of their air carriers, they present
similar characteristics, given that all of them are located in important tourism
destinations of the Mediterranean Sea and the Canary Islands. This is the case
of Alicante (0.31), Lanzarote (0.33), Fuerteventura (0.34), Tenerife Sur (0.3) or
Gran Canaria (0.34).
Finally, in Figure 4 we plot air carriers mark-up for every airport and their
size in terms of aircraft movements. We demonstrate the negative relationship
between the bargaining power of airlines and the size of the airport.
8 Conclusions
In this analysis, we propose a structural model to evaluate the motivation of
regional public authorities to arrange marketing agreements for route and tra¢ c
development in their corresponding airports. Then, we empirically test the
model using a tobit instrumental variable approach in order to assess factors
that may a¤ect the willingness of public funds that public authorities grant. We
demonstrate that: the inverse demand curve for public authorities is downward
sloping, the negative relationship between the total amount of the public budget
and the unit public fund, and the inuence of external factors such as: the
population of the catchment area, the distance of the nearest airport, variables
related to intermodal competition, location of the airport or the importance of
12The bargaining power of Ryanair was demonstrated in 2011 when the company threatened
to withdraw its base at Reus airport, after demanding 15 million euros from the regional
government to continue on that infrastructure. For its part, the government of Catalonia was
willing to pay 7.5 million euros. Finally, given the impossibility of an agreement, Ryanair
reduced from 30 to just 6 destinations in this airport for 2012.
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low-cost passengers.
Additionally, we observe that the sensitivity of demand for aircraft opera-
tions of regional public agencies increases as the size of the airport also increases.
Finally, we present an application of the proposed model to evaluate the market
power of airlines within these marketing agreements in a particular airport or
route, using the estimates of elasticity of demand and the Herndahl indexes in
a particular route or airport. The results show that those airports considered
as operating bases for a particular airline (Reus, Girona) and those located a
in low population territory (La Gomera, Melilla) present the highest airlines
mark-ups, whereas the lowest mark-ups correspond to those airports located
in the most important touristic destinations in the Mediterranean Sea and Ca-
nary Islands (Alicante, Lanzarote, Fuerteventura, Tenerife Sur, Cran Canaria).
These airports present operating prots and they are specialized in leisure pas-
sengers with a strong presence of low-cost and charter carriers. We believe that
this methodology and the empirical results presented in this manuscript may
be used either for regional public authorities, airlines, airport managers or even
the competition commission in the ex-ante or ex-post evaluation of the bilateral
agreements for route and tra¢ c development.
We also want to highlight some limitations in this study. While we appre-
ciate the e¤orts made by the CNC to gather information from the public funds
allocated to the airlines on tourism oriented marketing agreements, we believe
that the distribution of the funds for each route and airline should also be avail-
able. Thus, it would be possible to determine the relationship between public
funds, the power of the carriers when negotiating the granting of public funds
and nally the market power in the provision of air service. The lack of this
information has only allowed us to estimate the average degree of market power
at each airport, which may be a rst approach for future work on this topic.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium for a public agency with no subsidies
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Figure 2: Distribution of bilateral agreements by economic value
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Figure 3: Distribution of regional public funds allocated to agreements for the
period 2007-2011
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Table 1: Mean of public funds and characteristics of the Spanish airports (2007-
2011)
Airport aid pas cargo lowcost inc exp prod tour
mill e mill mill perc e/pas e/pas pas/sq mt
Albacete 1.44 0.01 0.00 0.00 14.28 270.42 6.72 230
Alicante 1.64 9.43 3.97 0.81 10.35 7.42 175.86 5,068
Almería 0.01 0.92 0.02 0.55 11.02 20.69 36.87 1,959
Asturias 1.72 1.42 0.14 0.27 9.22 11.69 81.62 1,436
Badajoz 1.87 0.07 0.00 0.00 10.94 44.80 16.60 422
Barcelona 0.00 30.80 98.30 0.43 11.84 12.67 43.85 9,321
Bilbao 0.00 4.01 2.86 0.31 10.90 9.44 79.31 753
Burgos 4.04 0.02 0.00 0.00 8.15 168.43 9.44 462
A Coruña 2.68 1.12 0.26 0.24 9.62 15.07 86.13 1,358
Fuerteventura 0.03 4.40 2.21 0.51 8.97 8.63 47.28 9,088
Girona 1.04 4.70 0.12 0.99 7.87 6.22 156.79 3,040
Granada-Jaén 0.00 1.19 0.05 0.48 8.57 14.44 140.02 1,701
Hierro 0.03 0.18 0.16 0.00 5.46 38.72 70.62 7,624
Ibiza 0.45 4.93 3.43 0.64 7.76 7.57 135.17 13,006
Jerez 0.00 1.21 0.10 0.52 10.59 19.50 75.33 2,902
Lanzarote 0.11 5.25 4.40 0.46 8.35 7.26 89.59 9,088
La Palma 0.08 1.09 1.11 0.16 6.88 20.24 102.47 7,624
Logroño 0.72 0.04 0.00 0.01 16.18 255.49 9.11 328
La Gomera 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.00 16.88 161.77 11.98 7,624
León 4.73 0.11 0.01 0.00 11.75 74.89 12.56 567
Gran Canaria 0.10 9.95 29.10 0.39 8.77 7.15 90.78 9,088
Madrid 0.11 50.20 345.00 0.18 13.17 13.93 50.62 10,523
Menorca 0.32 2.58 2.80 0.43 8.35 13.12 128.63 13,006
Málaga 0.03 12.60 4.02 0.73 10.86 11.24 31.64 6,909
Melilla 0.72 0.31 0.36 0.00 5.71 37.04 166.25 43
Palma de Mallorca 0.43 22.20 18.90 0.75 8.49 6.43 101.01 13,006
Pamplona 0.11 0.36 0.04 0.00 9.32 33.63 29.03 825
Reus 1.95 1.41 0.08 1.00 7.57 11.81 109.51 2,718
Salamanca 4.04 0.05 0.00 0.00 14.24 103.82 12.95 580
Murcia 0.96 1.62 0.00 0.92 8.74 9.29 127.38 1,469
San Sebastián 0.09 0.34 0.08 0.00 9.31 27.56 125.30 636
Tenerife Sur 0.26 8.00 6.46 0.75 10.43 8.19 93.71 7,624
Tenerife Norte 0.14 4.11 19.20 0.07 7.01 8.35 76.67 7,624
Santander 4.13 0.92 0.01 0.62 7.60 12.10 45.22 1,068
Santiago 1.33 2.11 2.18 0.52 9.66 12.56 112.50 1,358
Sevilla 0.00 4.43 5.82 0.65 9.89 9.54 71.43 2,881
Valencia 1.64 5.28 11.70 0.54 10.92 9.51 141.61 2,897
Valladolid 4.04 0.44 0.04 0.62 8.32 19.88 98.37 507
Vigo 0.53 1.17 1.25 0.12 9.57 17.98 149.87 1,068
Vitoria 0.12 0.07 31.30 0.13 85.60 435.56 12.11 471
Zaragoza 6.81 0.60 33.90 0.69 11.28 22.96 36.83 1,016
Total 1.15 4.76 15.10 0.37 14.19 48.95 76.21 4,034
aid: public funds; pas: total passengers; cargo: total cargo; lowcost: percentage of low-cost passengers
inc: total income; exp: total expenditures; prod: productivity of terminals; tour: tourism index (La Caixa)
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Figure 4: Relationship between aircraft movements (ATM) and airlines mark-
ups
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Table 2: Summary statistics of the variables
Units of measure Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Unit subsidy (s) Euros per aircraft 152.7 391.8 0 3,061.9
Aircraft movements (Y ) 50,987 83,943 937 483,292
Tourism-oriented budget (B) Million Euros 162.7 236.2 7.4 1,061.1
Population (pop) Inhabitants 1,273,182 1,673,589 10,558 6,458,684
Minimum distance of airports (dist) Kilometers 86.8 35.9 24 183
Island (isl) 0.29 0.45 0 1
Lowcost (lowcost) Percentage 0.37 0.32 0 1
Terminal productivity (product) Pass/sq. met 76.56 51.09 0 184.94
Density of motorways (motway) km/100km2 3.25 1.77 0 9.71
Density of railway (railway) km/100km2 3.10 2.59 0 9.03
Tourism index (tourism) 4,050.51 4,097.97 32 14,376
Industrial specialization index (eind) 0.91 0.57 0.11 2.47
Distance to Madrid (Mad) Kilometers 705.11 557.85 0 2258
Distance to Barcelona (BCN) Kilometers 951.01 731.6 0 2712
Airport category: First (ac1) 0.27 0.44 0 1
Airport category: Second (ac2) 0.25 0.43 0 1
Airport category: Third (ac3) 0.48 0.5 0 1
Herndahl index (H) 0.392 0.329 0 1
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Table 3: Estimates of the inverse demand function. Dependent variable: lns
(1) (2) (3)
Tobit IV Tobit IV Tobit
lnY -1.39 -3.45 -3.296
(-2.05) (-2.89) (-2.81)
lnB -3.55 -3.58 -3.733
(-3.23) (-3.19) (-3.39)
lnpop 0.88 2.15 2.011
(1.73) (2.71) (2.59)
lndist 1.83 2.22 2.253
(1.75) (2.02) (2.04)
isl -24.76 -22.1 -22.61
(-4.15) (-3.54) (-3.71)
lowcost 5.2 5.97 6.47
(3.71) (4.01) (4.47)
motway -4.36 -5.01 -5.197
(-2.04) (-2.25) (-2.38)
railway -3.34 -2.81 -2.632
(-1.81) (-1.47) (-1.41)
eind 2.9 2.46 2.31
(2.54) (2.02) (1.91)
tourism -0.000068 0.0004 0.0005
(-0.2) (1.04) (1.31)
lnMad 1.49 0.80 0.880
(0.66) (0.34) (0.39)
lnBCN 2.09 2.18 2.090
(1.78) (1.83) (1.91)
Constant 2.37 6.67 7.79
(-0.71) (0.5) (0.6)
Times dummies Included Included Included
Regional dummies Included Included Included
Wald test of exogeneity (21) 4.71
 3.56
Test of instruments
J statistic (22) 0.55 0.37
p-value 0.76 0.83
N 207 207 207
t statistics in parentheses
p < 0:10; p < 0:05; p < 0:01
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Table 4: Elasticities of unit public funds for di¤erent values of some relevant
variables
5% percentile 50% percentile 95% percentile
Total aircraft movements -2.391 -1.99 -1.125
Y (-3.73) (-4.13) (-19.22)
Public budget -3.22 -2.76 -1.05
B (-2.91) (-2.95) (1.67)
Population -1.87 -2.64 -2.94
pop (-5.23) (-2.97) (-2.76)
Percentage of lowcost passengers -2.21 -2.65 -3.07
lowcost (-3.08) (-2.97) (-2.87)
Density of motorways -3.43 -2.56 -0.16
motway (-2.89) (-2.94) (-2.52)
Industrial specialization index -2.41 -2.61 -2.98
eind (-2.85) (-2.95) (-3.02)
t statistics in parentheses
p < 0:10; p < 0:05; p < 0:01
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Table 5: Estimates of the airlines mark-ups for each airport
Airport Mark-up [95% Conf. Interval]
Albacete 1.58 0.51 2.66
Alicante 0.31 0.09 0.52
Almería 0.16 -0.04 0.36
Asturias 0.54 0.17 0.92
Badajoz 2.17 0.70 3.64
Burgos 1.69 0.54 2.83
A Coruña 0.76 0.24 1.27
Fuerteventura 0.34 0.11 0.57
Girona 2.20 0.74 3.65
El Hierro 2.58 0.88 4.27
Ibiza 0.33 0.1 0.56
Lanzarote 0.33 0.12 0.55
La Palma 0.83 0.28 1.38
La Rioja 2.1 0.67 3.53
La Gomera 3.4 1.05 5.79
León 1.56 0.5 2.63
Gran Canaria 0.34 0.11 0.57
Madrid 0.32 0.03 0.61
Menorca 0.46 0.5 0.78
Málaga 0.015 -0.015 0.045
Melilla 3.28 1.05 5.51
Palma de Mallorca 0.51 0.16 0.85
Pamplona 0.58 -0.07 1.23
Reus 2.35 0.75 3.96
Salamanca 1.26 0.47 2.05
Murcia 2.35 0.75 3.96
San Sebastián 0.58 -0.06 1.23
Tenerife Sur 0.30 0.09 0.51
Tenerife Norte 0.44 0.14 0.74
Santander 1.36 0.44 2.29
Santiago 0.49 0.15 0.82
Valencia 0.34 0.11 0.57
Valladolid 1.13 0.36 1.91
Vigo 0.58 0.19 0.98
Vitoria 1.75 0.40 3.11
Zaragoza 1.19 0.38 1.99
t statistics in parentheses
p < 0:10; p < 0:05; p < 0:01
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